Comments on: Brazilian Midair: Were U.S. Pilots to Blame? http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/ Aviation buzz and bold opinion Thu, 04 Dec 2008 23:18:36 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.5 By: Controller expert http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-7978 Controller expert Sat, 16 Jun 2007 17:32:41 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-7978 Dear Phil G, Sorry, you got it completely wrong. The transponder was turned on as required by the checklist. And this right from the take-off on. The radar pictures prove it. When the transponder went off, roughly 1 hour before the collision, the transponder went on STAND-BY, and not OFF. There is a big difference between the two. This can happen by an accidental finger manipulation, the soft keys are very tricky. So the radar tracking was lost and the anti-collision system TCAS stopped to work properly. I don't want to speculate if controllers should have noted the turned off transponder, but the picture they have made sense to them. Nor do I want to speculate if 2 professional pilots should have noted the TCAS OFF message on their MFD and PFD. It made all sense to them and we have other reported occurrences where this had happened before. Speculations are not a clever thing when a terrible accident occurred. Let's wait for the final accident report to come out and clarify this. Will it really? Dear Phil G,

Sorry, you got it completely wrong.

The transponder was turned on as required by the checklist. And this right from the take-off on. The radar pictures prove it.

When the transponder went off, roughly 1 hour before the collision, the transponder went on STAND-BY, and not OFF. There is a big difference between the two. This can happen by an accidental finger manipulation, the soft keys are very tricky.

So the radar tracking was lost and the anti-collision system TCAS stopped to work properly.

I don’t want to speculate if controllers should have noted the turned off transponder, but the picture they have made sense to them.

Nor do I want to speculate if 2 professional pilots should have noted the TCAS OFF message on their MFD and PFD. It made all sense to them and we have other reported occurrences where this had happened before.

Speculations are not a clever thing when a terrible accident occurred. Let’s wait for the final accident report to come out and clarify this. Will it really?

]]> By: IsuzuDave http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-4735 IsuzuDave Wed, 23 May 2007 20:29:11 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-4735 I am an air traffic controller at an ARTCC in the US. From all of the reading I have done, this looks like the controllers are responsible for putting these two planes together. If the Legacy jets transponder was never turned, on and they are not RADAR identified, how can the controllers provid them RADAR service. If this deal happened where I work the controllers would but it. It would have been great if the transponder was turned on. The pilots or the controller would have had a better chance avoiding this accident. It sounds like these planes are in conflict regardless of transponder status. I am an air traffic controller at an ARTCC in the US. From all of the reading I have done, this looks like the controllers are responsible for putting these two planes together. If the Legacy jets transponder was never turned, on and they are not RADAR identified, how can the controllers provid them RADAR service. If this deal happened where I work the controllers would but it.
It would have been great if the transponder was turned on. The pilots or the controller would have had a better chance avoiding this accident. It sounds like these planes are in conflict regardless of transponder status.

]]> By: BP http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-4670 BP Tue, 22 May 2007 05:22:11 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-4670 Even if the transponder was not switched on, ATC should have recognized that when they first called departure control after takeoff. Another apparent link in the chain leading up to the accident. For the aircraft to be under radar control (wasn't it?) and not ever have had the non-operation of the transponder remarked on is very strange indeed. Even if the transponder was not switched on, ATC should have recognized that when they first called departure control after takeoff. Another apparent link in the chain leading up to the accident. For the aircraft to be under radar control (wasn’t it?) and not ever have had the non-operation of the transponder remarked on is very strange indeed.

]]> By: Phil G http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-4198 Phil G Fri, 11 May 2007 23:30:36 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-4198 The NTSB report discusses the conversation in the cockpit immediately following the mid-air (taken from the CVR). It wasn't printed as in a transcript, but what they said was that the pilot's noticed their transponder was in standby, they hadn't switched it on prior to takeoff. Also.....see below Reasons for Aircraft Collisions Despite TCAS Subject to Eurocontrol Analysis Reacting to a just-issued Eurocontrol Safety Warning Message (SWM) about the loss of traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) functionality, a Germany-based airline captain says many airline checklists are now eliminating a final check on whether TCAS is switched on when lining up for take-off. The reason, he says, is that such a check, which “creates a head-down moment” at a high-workload, high-risk moment, is missed or ignored for runway safety reasons. The captain notes that TCAS drills before take-off have been modified because of the increasing use of Mode S ground surveillance by air traffic control, which means that TCAS is now left at standby during taxiing instead of being turned on with the transponder after engine start as it used to be. Eurocontrol safety management tools expert Tzvetomir Blajev, examining the lessons emerging from the Gol Boeing 737-800 collision with an Embraer Legacy business jet over Brazil last September used the emailed SWM to remind pilots that the TCAS and the transponder must both be switched on, otherwise there will be no airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) alerts to the pilots in conflicting aeroplanes. The US NTSB says evidence suggests the Legacy’s TCAS was serviceable but not switched on, and neither aircraft received any ACAS warning as a result. Flight International 5/8/07 The NTSB report discusses the conversation in the cockpit immediately following the mid-air (taken from the CVR). It wasn’t printed as in a transcript, but what they said was that the pilot’s noticed their transponder was in standby, they hadn’t switched it on prior to takeoff. Also…..see below

Reasons for Aircraft Collisions Despite TCAS Subject to Eurocontrol Analysis

Reacting to a just-issued Eurocontrol Safety Warning Message (SWM) about the loss of traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) functionality, a Germany-based airline captain says many airline checklists are now eliminating a final check on whether TCAS is switched on when lining up for take-off. The reason, he says, is that such a check, which “creates a head-down moment” at a high-workload, high-risk moment, is missed or ignored for runway safety reasons.

The captain notes that TCAS drills before take-off have been modified because of the increasing use of Mode S ground surveillance by air traffic control, which means that TCAS is now left at standby during taxiing instead of being turned on with the transponder after engine start as it used to be. Eurocontrol safety management tools expert Tzvetomir Blajev, examining the lessons emerging from the Gol Boeing 737-800 collision with an Embraer Legacy business jet over Brazil last September used the emailed SWM to remind pilots that the TCAS and the transponder must both be switched on, otherwise there will be no airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) alerts to the pilots in conflicting aeroplanes. The US NTSB says evidence suggests the Legacy’s TCAS was serviceable but not switched on, and neither aircraft received any ACAS warning as a result.

Flight International 5/8/07

]]> By: Robert Mark http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-4160 Robert Mark Fri, 11 May 2007 16:24:41 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-4160 My use of the term "broke" probably wasn't the best, but you are correct that I meant functionally inoperative. Your comment about the pilots having missed the transponder on takeoff ... can you tell me where you read that? Rob My use of the term “broke” probably wasn’t the best, but you are correct that I meant functionally inoperative.

Your comment about the pilots having missed the transponder on takeoff … can you tell me where you read that?

Rob

]]> By: Phil G http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/05/brazilian-midair-were-us-pilots-to-blame/#comment-4159 Phil G Fri, 11 May 2007 15:34:55 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/?p=164#comment-4159 In general, I agree with what you are saying, however you should be sure of your facts before writing something like this. The transponder was not "broke" as you indicate. It was "non-functional" as you said, but the reason it was non-functional is because the Legacy pilots failed to switch it from standby to on prior to takeoff, and yes it is a pre-takeoff checklist item. The Legacy's transponder was simply never turned on, and therefor the TCAS was also non-functional.....and the pilots never noticed the "TCAS not operational" advisory on their displays.....until after the accident. In general, I agree with what you are saying, however you should be sure of your facts before writing something like this. The transponder was not “broke” as you indicate. It was “non-functional” as you said, but the reason it was non-functional is because the Legacy pilots failed to switch it from standby to on prior to takeoff, and yes it is a pre-takeoff checklist item. The Legacy’s transponder was simply never turned on, and therefor the TCAS was also non-functional…..and the pilots never noticed the “TCAS not operational” advisory on their displays…..until after the accident.

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