Comments on: Legacy Pilots Turned Off Transponder, Brazil Says http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/07/legacy-pilots-turned-off-transponder-brazil-says/ Aviation buzz and bold opinion Fri, 29 Aug 2008 05:17:07 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.1 By: Keith Peshak http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/07/legacy-pilots-turned-off-transponder-brazil-says/#comment-8860 Keith Peshak Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:01:41 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/07/legacy-pilots-turned-off-transponder-brazil-says/#comment-8860 1. On the "old stuff" all the pilot has is a blinking light (every transponder reply). Pilots have too much to do to watch see if a light is still blinking. On the "new stuff" for "big iron" even that isn't there. In this specific system no "bong-bong" and no "red blinking light on the status panel" and no daughterly voice saying "your transponder is off". Ergo, no way to know. 2. This is a newly integrated system of two mutually exclusive boxes - transponder allows to be seen, TCAS sees. Takes a double failure to cause "can't see and can't be seen". Honeywell integrated them (if one croaks they both croak). This is called a fundamental systems design failure. Ergo, why do we criminalize the pilots instead of the certifying entity (FAA)? 3. Then there is the issue about "timed knobbing", good ol' 2006-19-04: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1BDDC176AC629452862571E70059100D?OpenDocument. This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the ATC code. Why would you design it that way? Why didn’t the FAA catch this in certification? Can't get no dumber than that! Learn about drop out & coast mode & track jump & phantoms & ring around (all FAA terms for the way radar normally operates) at http://www.collisionavoidance.org 1. On the “old stuff” all the pilot has is a blinking light (every transponder reply). Pilots have too much to do to watch see if a light is still blinking. On the “new stuff” for “big iron” even that isn’t there. In this specific system no “bong-bong” and no “red blinking light on the status panel” and no daughterly voice saying “your transponder is off”. Ergo, no way to know.

2. This is a newly integrated system of two mutually exclusive boxes - transponder allows to be seen, TCAS sees. Takes a double failure to cause “can’t see and can’t be seen”. Honeywell integrated them (if one croaks they both croak). This is called a fundamental systems design failure. Ergo, why do we criminalize the pilots instead of the certifying entity (FAA)?

3. Then there is the issue about “timed knobbing”, good ol’ 2006-19-04:
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1BDDC176AC629452862571E70059100D?OpenDocument. This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the ATC code. Why would you design it that way? Why didn’t the FAA catch this in certification? Can’t get no dumber than that!

Learn about drop out & coast mode & track jump & phantoms & ring around (all FAA terms for the way radar normally operates) at http://www.collisionavoidance.org

]]> By: Bill P. http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/07/legacy-pilots-turned-off-transponder-brazil-says/#comment-8513 Bill P. Thu, 05 Jul 2007 01:34:24 +0000 http://www.jetwhine.com/2007/07/legacy-pilots-turned-off-transponder-brazil-says/#comment-8513 <p>That is such cxxp!<br /> Anyone who had read the air traffic controller's description of the systemic errors in the brazilian ATC system knows what happened.</p> That is such cxxp!
Anyone who had read the air traffic controller’s description of the systemic errors in the brazilian ATC system knows what happened.

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