Seething About the Buffalo Crash
I don’t know what makes me more angry, the story in the Wall Street Journal that claims investigators are pointing the finger of blame at the pilots of the Dash 8 Q400 in the Buffalo crash a few weeks ago, or that from a pilot-training perspective we seem to be reliving a reality that should be all too familiar after the ice-related 1994 ATR crash in Roselawn Indiana, as well as the Brasilia crash near Detroit in 1997.
The issue of pilot qualifications and training are sure to make headlines again soon, as well, after Buffalo – not to mention pilot hiring standards, crew duty times and an overall focus on the bottom line. The historic conflicts between NTSB recommendations and actions taken by the still leader-less FAA are certain to get in the way as well.
While the NTSB’s job is gathering all the facts to determine a probable cause, I – as a flight instructor – see issues related to wing contamination that should be well-known to other aviators, like letting the autopilot fly the aircraft in icing conditions. I’m not waiting for every single detail to emerge before I remind students and fellow pilots that ice of any part of the airplane is nothing to screw around with. It seems senseless that any pilot is forced to reread the basics of aerodynamics on lift generation, but as long as people keep breaking airplanes in ice, we seem to have little choice. The myriad of NTSB accident reports related to ice are a great place to begin reinforcing the deadliness of complacency around contamination of wings and tail plane.
Absolutely Right, or Wrong?
The real question now seems to be whether the Dash 8 crew in Buffalo experienced a wing stall due to ice build up, or a tail-plane stall because of the frozen water attached to the rear airfoils. That’s why the NTSB will be replaying the data recorder again and again over the coming months.
What makes this accident so frightening to anyone who flies were the NTSB comments about how the Dash 8 captain added power and pulled back on the control column – enough to overpower the stick shaker – when the aircraft stalled. If that was a traditional wing stall incident, that was absolutely the wrong action to take.
If, however, the tail-plane stalled, adding power and pulling back on the column was the right reaction.
In either case though, an incident like this at low altitude left few recovery options and hence the urgent need to shake other aviators up until they realize the seriousness of ice on the wings or tail surfaces.
We’ll need to wait for NTSB to determine the cause for certain, but watching this old NASA icing-research video is an eye-opener because of the eery similarities between the script and the details emerging from Buffalo. The video comes to us courtesy of the Aviation Chatter blog.
If you fly an airplane IFR, this 22-min. video is a must see. Pay particular attention to the recovery of the airplane from a full stall about two thirds of the way through the show.
Although the video was designed around aircraft with un-powered flight controls, it reminds us all of the issues the Continental Connection pilots may well have been dealing with, especially the abrupt changes to a wing’s ability to generate lift with a load of ice when the first notch of flaps was added and the aircraft slowed.
Warning: This video does includes classic aerodynamic discussions that could scare the heck out of some pilots and with good reason. Carrying a load of ice on an airplane forces you to become a test pilot, so realizing that an airplane could take your life if you become complacent about an issue like ice is not all a bad thing. Here’s an interview I did with WRHU radio about the crash.


